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Abstract	
	
In	1965	Sidney	Pollard	published	The	Genesis	of	Modern	Management,	an	extended	discussion	of	the	
problems,	during	Britain’s	initial	period	of	industrialisation,	of	the	‘internal	management’	of	the	firm.	
But,	in	his	focus	on	industry,	Pollard	ignored	one	of	the	largest,	most	significant	and	most	innovative	
of	the	enterprises	of	the	late-eighteenth-	and	early-nineteenth	centuries:	The	Bank	of	England.	This	
paper	focuses	on	the	Bank	as	a	site	of	precocious	managerial	development.	It	first	establishes	that	the	
Bank,	 by	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century,	 encompassed	 the	 complexities	 of	 a	 large-scale	
industrial	enterprise.	It	employed	a	workforce	of	several	hundred.	Its	workers	operated	in	specialised	
and	coordinated	capacities.	 Its	managerial	hierarchy	was	diffuse	and	dependent	on	employed	men,	
rather	 than	 the	 elected	 directorate.	 The	 Bank,	 therefore,	 warrants	 comparison	 with	 the	 types	 of	
enterprises	 identified	 by	 Pollard.	 Focusing	 on	 the	 1780s,	 the	 paper	 then	 explores	 the	 Bank’s	
organisational	and	management	structure	against	Pollard’s	four	aspects	of	management:	‘the	creation	
and	training	of	a	class	of	managers;	‘the	recruitment,	training,	disciplining	and	acculturation	of	labour’;	
the	use	of	‘accountancy,	and	other	information	…in	the	rational	determination	of	their	decisions’	and	
finally	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 there	 emerged	 a	 ‘theory	 and	 practice	 of	 “management”’.	 It	 will	
demonstrate	that,	although	not	always	applied	effectively,	the	Bank’s	senior	men	did	show	managerial	
innovation	and	skill	in	training	and	organising	the	workforce	and	were	able	to	make	informed	decisions	
which	had	the	potential	to	improve	some	of	the	Bank’s	processes.		
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Sidney	 Pollard’s	 seminal	 work	 posited	 that	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 the	 genesis	 of	
management	was	a	‘glaring	gap’	in	the	history	of	industrialising	Britain.1	Yet	his	own	analysis	
remained	 narrowly	 focused	 on	 the	 factory	 and	 other	 large	 industrial	 processes.	 Forms	 of	
economic	 activity	 that	 might	 have	 displayed	 similar	 complexity	 were	 mentioned	 only	 in	
passing.	In	particular,	Pollard	failed	to	acknowledge	one	of	the	largest	and	most	significant	
enterprises	of	the	late-eighteenth-	and	early-nineteenth	centuries:	the	Bank	of	England.	This	
paper	will	demonstrate	 that,	had	Pollard	 turned	his	attention	to	 the	Bank,	he	would	have	
discovered	 factory-like	 organisation	 of	 ‘production’	 with	 well-established	 and	 managerial	
systems	in	place	and	strata	of	lower,	middle	and	senior	management.		
Pollard,	along	with	other	commentators	on	the	history	of	management,	acknowledge	
that	 elements	 of	 complex	 organisation	 existed	 long	 before	 industrialisation.2	 Ancient	 and	
classical	 civilisations	 planned,	 organised,	 controlled	 and	 centralised.	 But	 these	managerial	
techniques	were	used	in	support	of	religious,	political	or	military	endeavour	not	industry	or	
commerce.3	 Arguably,	 the	 systematic	 application	 of	 such	 techniques	 in	 the	 pursuit	 of	
production	for	profit	came	with	industrialisation	and	required	processes	which	constituted	a	
significant	challenge	for	the	early	entrepreneur.4	These	included	the	need	to	manage	a	large	
amount	of	fixed	capital	and	stocks	of	raw	materials.	Management	of	labour	too	presented	
problems.	The	workforce	needed	to	be	made	to	conform	to	longer	and	more	regular	hours	
and	 oversight	 was	 required	 to	 ensure	 efficiency,	 maximise	 the	 output	 from	 labour	 and	
minimise	losses	such	as	those	from	theft	or	fraud.	All	of	this	required	the	evolution	of	systems	
                                                            
1 Sidney Pollard, The Genesis of Modern Management (Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 11.  
2 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 17; John F. Wilson and Andrew Thomson, The Making of Modern 
Management: British Management in Historical Perspective (Oxford, 2006), pp. 6-7.  
3 Wilson and Thomson, Making of Modern Management, p. 6.  
4 Ibid.  
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to	plan	and	coordinate	production	and	to	measure	and	account	for	costs,	depreciation	and	
profits.5	The	notion	of	management	implies	not	just	a	mastery	of	these	issues	and	techniques	
but	also	the	emergence	of	a	class	of	individuals,	often	separate	from	owners,	to	carry	those	
out.6	The	effectiveness	of	managers	and	the	efficiency	of	their	methods	of	organisation	and	
control	are	a	key	part	of	this	story.	Good	management	is	‘widely	accepted	as	the	factor	of	
production	most	able	to	provide	a	competitive	advantage’.7		
Sidney	Pollard’s	analysis	focused	attention	on	four	key	aspects	of	management	during	
industrialisation:	 first,	 ‘the	 creation	 and	 training	 of	 a	 class	 of	 managers;	 second,	 ‘the	
recruitment,	training,	disciplining	and	acculturation	of	labour’;	third,	the	use	of	accountancy,	
and	 other	 available,	 gathered	 or	 created	 information	 in	 the	 ‘rational	 determination	 of	
…decisions’	 and	 finally	 the	question	of	whether	 entrepreneurs	 operated	by	 a	 ‘theory	 and	
practice	 of	 “management”,	 as	 distinct	 from	merely	making	ad	 hoc	 decisions	 unrelated	 to	
information	about	their	businesses.8	Although	Pollard	warned	against	generalisation	and	did	
indeed	provide	some	examples	of	highly	effective	management	 techniques,	 such	as	 those	
utilised	 by	 Bolton	 and	 Watt,	 he	 concluded	 that	 the	 problems	 of	 management	 during	
industrialisation	were	many	 and	while	 entrepreneurs	were	 inventive,	 their	 energies	were	
directed	to	keeping	up	with	innovation	and	social	change.	Management	techniques	did	not	
lead	change	and	no	over-arching	managerial	theory	was	developed	during	industrialisation.9					
Wilson	and	Thomson	extended	the	analysis	and	argued	that	Britain,	so	precocious	in	
industrial	 development,	 remained	 behindhand	 when	 it	 came	 to	 the	 development	 of	
managerial	 techniques.	 Corporate	 structures	 developed	 in	 impressive	 ways	 in	 the	 US,	
                                                            
5 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, pp. 14-16.  
6 Wilson and Thomson, Making of Modern Management, p. 3. 
7 Ibid., p. 5.  
8 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 16.  
9 Ibid., pp. 313-315.  
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Germany	and	Japan	driven	by	their	greater	reliance	on	large-scale	enterprise.	Too	long	mired	
in	 the	 small-	 or	 family-firm	 type	 of	 organisation,	 British	management	 systems	made	 little	
progress.	Institutional	and	cultural	factors	which	might	have	provided	networks	of	support	or	
underpinned	a	higher	status	for	managers	were	weak	in	Britain.	Moreover	the	personal	and	
proprietorial	capitalism	that	persisted	tended	to	concentrate	strategic	decision-making	in	the	
hands	of	owners.10		
	 Britain,	therefore,	has	been	argued	to	represent	a	case	study	in	the	managerial	failure	
of	large-scale	business.	This	paper	does	not	seek	to	overturn	the	overall	findings	of	scholars	
like	 Pollard,	 Wilson	 and	 Thomson	 but	 it	 will	 establish	 that	 failure	 to	 consider	 the	
financialisation,	as	well	as	the	industrialisation,	of	Britain	restricts	our	understanding	of	the	
development	 of	managerial	 capitalism.	 To	 that	 end	 it	will	 first	 establish	 that	 the	 Bank	 of	
England,	by	 the	 latter	part	of	 the	eighteenth	 century,	 encompassed	 the	 complexities	of	 a	
large-scale	industrial	enterprise	and	thus	warrants	comparison	with	the	types	of	enterprises	
identified	by	Pollard.	It	will	then	explore	the	Bank’s	organisational	and	management	structure	
against	 the	 above-mentioned	 four	 aspects	 of	 management.	 Because	 of	 the	 wealth	 of	
information	available	about	the	Bank	of	England	and	the	longevity	of	the	institution,	the	paper	
will	 focus	on	the	early	1780s,	a	period	that	arguably	saw	a	 rise	 in	 industrial	activity	and	a	
moment	in	time	when	the	Bank	itself	undertook	a	serious	and	extensive	examination	of	its	
own	structures.		
	
The	Context		
Despite	 its	 early	 development,	 longevity	 and	 complexity,	 the	 eighteenth-century	 Bank	 of	
England	has	not	featured	in	histories	of	business	development.	Indeed,	this	period	has	been	
                                                            
10 Wilson and Thomson, Making of Modern Management, p. 3; pp. 255-273. 
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characterised	by	Chandler	and	others	as	one	of	personal	capitalism	in	which	ownership	and	
management	were	intertwined	and	an	individual	or	a	small	group	made	strategic,	functional	
and	operational	decisions.11	This	characterisation	does	not	suit	the	Bank	of	England	at	any	
stage	of	its	history.		
Equally,	the	early	development	of	management	techniques	and	organisation	have	not	
featured	 in	 banking	 and	 financial	 histories.	 The	 enforcement	 of	 the	 Bank	 of	 England’s	
monopoly	and	thus	the	prohibition	of	joint-stock	banking	until	1826	ensured	that,	until	that	
point,	 banking	 operations	 remained	 small	 with	 simple	 organisational	 structures.	 In	
consequence,	 most	 historians	 of	 banking	 do	 not	 spend	 much	 time	 on	 the	 operational	
functions	of	 the	eighteenth-century	 incarnations	of	 their	 subjects.12	 Even	Temin	and	Voth	
who	 were	 more	 concerned	 with	 how	 banking	 operated	 still	 devoted	 little	 space	 to	 the	
question	of	how	the	Hoare	family	ran	its	business	and	they	failed	to	write	of	its	organisation	
in	 terms	 that	 stress	 any	 type	 of	management	 structure.13	 John	 Brewer’s	 account	 of	 fiscal	
administration	 is	perhaps	the	closest	we	have	to	a	discussion	of	white-collar	management	
during	the	eighteenth	century	but	it	was	not	written,	and	has	not	been	read,	as	an	exploration	
of	management	techniques.14			
	 Moreover,	the	Bank	of	England’s	organisation	and	management	during	the	eighteenth	
century	 has	 been	 largely	 ignored.	 John	 Clapham	 offered	 some	 discussion	 of	 the	 Bank’s	
                                                            
11 John F. Wilson, British Business History, 1720-1994 (Manchester, 1995), p. 13 Chandler made the same 
arguments with regard to the US. Alfred D. Chandler Jr., The Visible Hand: the managerial revolution in 
American business (Cambridge Mass. and London, 1977).  
12 See for example, Margaret Ackrill and Leslie Hannah, Barclays: The Business of Banking, 1690-1996 
(Cambridge, 2008); S. G. Checkland, Scottish banking: A history, 1695–1973 (London, 1975); W. F. Crick and 
J. E. Wadsworth, A Hundred Years of Joint-Stock Banking (London, 1958); L. S. Pressnell, Country banking in 
the industrial revolution (Oxford, 1956); R. S. Sayers, Lloyds Bank in the history of English banking (London, 
1957). 
13 Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth, Prometheus Shackled: Goldsmith Banks and England’s Financial 
Revolution After 1700 (Oxford, 2013), pp. 136-140.  
14 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: war, money and the English state 1688-1783 (London, 1989). For an 
older discussion of public administration see J. E. D. Binney, British finance and public administration, 1774-
1792 (Oxford, 1958).  
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internal	structure	and	decision-making	but	the	institution’s	historians	generally	have	confined	
themselves	to	placing	the	Bank	in	its	political	and	economic	context,	rather	than	analysis	of	
its	internal	organisation.15	The	only	one	to	pay	more	attention	to	the	operation	of	the	Bank	
was	W.	Marston	Acres	but	his	approach	was	rather	more	antiquarian	than	scholarly.16	This	
neglect	of	the	Bank’s	organisation	and	management	is	despite	the	wealth	of	sources	that	have	
been	preserved	in	the	institution’s	archive	and	fact	that	a	series	of	Committees	of	Inspection	
were	constituted	from	the	1780s	and	produced	reports	which	can	give	us	significant	insight	
into	the	way	the	Bank	operated.		
	 This	paper	uses	the	reports	of	the	Committee	of	Inspection,	established	in	1783,	as	a	
basis	for	the	following	discussion.	The	Committee	was	set	up	in	the	aftermath	of	the	War	of	
American	 Independence	 amidst	 accusations	 of	 corruption	 in	 the	 public	 finances	 and	 an	
attempt	by	Parliament	to	put	its	financial	house	in	order	through	a	Commission	for	Examining	
the	 Public	 Accounts.	 The	 Commission	 sat	 between	 1780	 and	 1787,	 produced	 fifteen	
comprehensive	reports	and	began	the	process	of	reform	of	the	public	finances.17	The	Bank	of	
England	did	not	fall	under	the	purview	of	the	Commission	but	did,	in	March	1783,	set	up	its	
own	Committee	‘to	inspect	and	enquire	into	the	mode	and	execution	of	the	Business	as	now	
carried	 on	 in	 [its]	 different	 departments’.18	 The	 Committee	 of	 three	 directors	 were	
empowered	to	investigate	every	aspect	of	business	and	inspect	‘all	such	Books	and	Papers	as	
they	may	think	necessary’.19		
                                                            
15 Notably A. Andreades, A History of the Bank of England (London, 1909); John H. Clapham, The Bank of 
England: A History (2 Volumes. Cambridge, 1966); John Giuseppi, The Bank of England: A History from its 
Foundation in 1694 (London, 1966). 
16 W. Marston Acres, The Bank of England from within (2 vols., London, 1931).  
17 Binney, British Public Finance.  
18 Bank of England Archives [hereafter BEA], M5/212, Minutes of the Committee of Inspection, fo. 1.  
19 Ibid.   
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The	Inspectors	were	all	not	senior	men	at	the	Bank,	Samuel	Bosanquet	had	been	a	
director	 for	 twelve	 years	 and	 Thomas	 Dea	 for	 eight	 years.	 The	 third	 Inspector,	 Benjamin	
Winthrop,	had	joined	the	directorship	just	one	year	before	the	Inspection.20	Nonetheless,	the	
cooperation	the	Inspectors	received	appears	to	have	been	complete	and	their	approach	was	
thorough.	Their	final	report	ran	to	over	80,000	words	and	it	offers	a	comprehensive	record	of	
the	various	aspects	of	the	Bank’s	business	including	the	management	of	the	national	debt,	
procedures	for	discounting	of	bills	of	exchange,	the	printing	and	issuance	of	notes,	and	the	
management	of	 the	cash	and	customer	accounts.	The	Committee	of	 Inspection	also	made	
recommendations	to	improve	efficiency	and	security.		
The	report	firmly	establishes	that	the	Bank	was	precisely	the	kind	of	enterprise	that	
Pollard	was	discussing.	 Indeed,	by	 the	end	of	 the	eighteenth	century	 the	Bank	of	England	
epitomised	managerial	capitalism.	It	was	a	joint-stock	company	with,	what	was	by	that	time,	
a	body	of	several	thousand	shareholders.21	The	Bank’s	dual	role	as	banker	to	the	state	and	
manager	 of	 the	 state’s	 debt	 must	 not	 distract	 us	 from	 its	 status	 as	 a	 private	 business	
answerable	 to	 its	 shareholders	 and	 dependent	 on	 remaining	 profitable.22	 The	 business	
operated	under	the	directorship	of	a	governor,	deputy	governor	and	24	directors	and,	in	1783,	
it	employed	321	permanent	clerks.	This	was	more	than	double	the	white	collar	staff	of	the	
East	India	Company,	which	in	1785	had	a	staff	of	159	clerical	workers	in	London,	and	ten	times	
the	 numbers	 employed	 by	 the	 large	 insurance	 companies:	 the	 Royal	 Exchange	 and	 Sun	
                                                            
20 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 205.  
21 According to Clapham’s figures there were 2588 shareholders eligible to vote at shareholders’ meetings in 
1771 and 2465 in 1791. To be eligible to vote a shareholder had to have £500 or more in stock and to have held 
that stock for six calendar months. Clapham, Bank of England, p. 285.  
22 H.V. Bowen, ‘The Bank of England during the Long Eighteenth Century, 1694-1820’ in R. Roberts and D. 
Kynaston (eds.), The Bank of England: Money, Power and Influence 1694-1994 (Oxford, 1995), 1-18. 
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Assurance	 companies.23	 Indeed,	 the	 late	 eighteenth-century	 Bank	 of	 England	 was	
undoubtedly	the	largest	private	employer	of	white-collar	workers	in	Britain,	if	not	the	world.		
The	 Bank	 was	 organised	 as	 two	 large	 departments:	 the	 Cashiers’	 Office	 and	 the	
Accountants’	Office	and	each	of	those	departments	was	sub-divided	into	more	than	a	dozen	
offices.	Within	these	offices	each	clerk	tended	to	operate	 in	a	specialised	capacity.	Juniors	
were	supervised	by	senior	colleagues	and	work	was	heavily	coordinated	within	and	between	
offices	to	ensure	effective	working.	The	effect	was	to	make	the	organisation	of	work	at	the	
Bank	akin	to	that	in	a	large	factory.		
The	 scale	 of	 the	 work	 undertaken	 by	 the	 Bank	 is	 indicated	 both	 by	 external	
comparisons	and	internal	measures.	Notably,	as	indicated	in	table	1,	the	Bank	was	managing	
two-thirds	of	the	state’s	debt	by	the	mid-eighteenth	century.	This	was	a	serious	commitment	
as	it	placed	the	Bank	in	a	position	of	trust	as	the	mediator	between	the	state	and	its	creditors.		
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
                                                            
23 H. V. Bowen, The Business of Empire: the East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756-1833 (Cambridge, 
2006), p 139; H. M. Boot, Real incomes of the British middle class, 1760-1850: the experience of clerks at the 
East India Company. Economic History Review, 52 (1999), p. 639. The EIC employed a total staff of over 1,700 
if warehouse labourers and dock workers are included in the count. B. Supple, The Royal Exchange Assurance: 
a history of British insurance, 1720-1970 (Cambridge, 1970), p. 70.  
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Table	1:	Agencies	handling	the	national	debt	c.	176424	
		 Principal	Sum	
%age	
handled		 Annual	Payments	
%age	
handled		
Handled	at	the	Bank		 77,265,945	 69.85	 2,682,163	 70.72	
Handled	at	South	Sea	House		 27,125,310	 24.52	 829,507	 21.87	
Handled	at	East	India	House		 4,200,000	 3.80	 127,687	 3.37	
Handled	at	the	Exchequer		 2,022,582	 1.83	 153,236	 4.04	
	 	 	 	 	
Total	National	Debt		 110,613,836	 		 3,792,594	 		
Source:	J.	H.	Clapham,	The	Bank	of	England:	a	history	(Cambridge,	1966),	p.	103.		
	
It	was	unquestionably	work	for	the	state	that	created	the	most	significant	workload	
for	 the	Bank’s	 clerks.	 For	example,	 the	 issue	of	4%	annuities	during	 the	War	of	American	
Independence	resulted	in	the	need	to	open	19,500	new	accounts	in	one	day.25	The	work	of	
compiling	a	list	of	unpaid	dividends	for	the	Exchequer	was	so	time-consuming	that	it	could	
take	up	to	5	or	6	months.26	More	than	65,000	dividend	warrants	were	issued	for	payment	on	
5	 January	1783	and	nearly	59,000	 in	April	1783.27	The	sheer	scale	of	 regular	business	also	
presented	problems.	The	clerks	who	kept	the	K	cash	book,	in	which	were	recorded	notes	in	
long	lists	for	the	Exchequer,	other	public	offices	and	some	bankers,	estimated	that	they	made	
up	around	20,000	notes	a	month.28	Mr	Isaac	Pilleau	estimated	that	137,000	bills	of	exchange	
had	been	discounted	in	the	course	of	1782.	Each	discount	required	a	posting	to	the	account	
                                                            
24 Amounts rounded to the nearest £1.  
25 BEA, M5/213, fos. 43-44.  
26 BEA, M5/213, fo. 62.  
27 Ibid., fo. 126.  
28 BEA, M5/212, fo. 91; fo. 99.  
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with	and	the	account	upon	at	the	time	of	discount	and	from	the	two	accounts	at	the	time	of	
payment.29	The	type	of	work	conducted	by	the	Bank	and	the	need	to	ensure	that	records	were	
updated	by	the	end	of	each	day	necessitated	the	creation	of	what	could	be	termed	as	two	
shifts	 within	 the	 Bank.	Most	 men	 worked	 office	 hours	 from	 9.00am	 or	 a	 little	 earlier	 to	
between	3.30	and	5.00pm.	Other	men	continued	their	working	day	well	into	the	evening	to	
update	the	records	to	reflect	the	day’s	business.	This	process	started	at	around	4.00pm	and	
continued	sometimes	beyond	8.00pm.30		
	 As	this	level	of	complexity	suggests,	the	Bank	could	not	operate	without	a	significant	
and	well-established	management	structure.	The	discussion	will	now	turn	to	the	Committee	
of	 Inspection	 reports	 and	 will	 use	 them	 to	 address	 Pollard’s	 four	 aspects	 of	 modern	
management:	 the	 creation	of	 a	 class	of	managers;	 the	acculturation	of	 labour;	 the	use	of	
information	in	decision-making;	and	the	existence	of	a	theory	of	management.		
	
A	class	of	managers	
The	management	of	the	Bank’s	business	began	with	a	court	of	24	directors,	a	deputy	governor	
and	governor	elected	from	amongst	the	most	prominent	shareholders.	These	men	were	not	
paid	employees,	although	the	governor	and	deputy	governor	did	receive	an	allowance	of	£200	
each	per	annum,	while	each	Director	received	£150	per	annum.31	The	directors	tended	to	be	
affluent	 businessmen,	 often	 bankers	 or	merchants.	 Some	did	 a	 very	 good	 job	 and	 others	
certainly	did	not.	Some	attended	the	Bank’s	meetings	regularly	and	others	did	not.	The	Bank’s	
bye-laws	stipulated	that	not	more	than	sixteen	of	those	who	had	been	directors	in	each	year	
                                                            
29 BEA, M5/213, fos. 8-9.  
30 See for example, BEA, M5/212, fo. 65.  
31 Acres, Bank from Within, p. 91.  
10 
 
could	stand	for	re-election	in	the	following	year.32	In	practice,	however,	some	directors	stayed	
long	in	post,	only	taking	short	breaks	when	necessary	to	abide	by	the	bye-laws.	Clapham’s	
analysis	noted	several	who	served	for	over	thirty	years	including	during	the	late	eighteenth	
century,	Edward	Payne,	a	director	from	1756	to	at	least	1794;	Samuel	Beachcroft	who	served,	
albeit	with	a	couple	of	short	breaks,	from	1760	to	1796	and	Richard	Neave	who	began	as	a	
director	in	1763	and	continued	until	well	into	the	nineteenth	century.33		
Although	the	Court	of	Directors	met	weekly,	day-to-day	management	was	dominated	
by	the	Bank’s	various	Committees.	The	Committees	were	appointed	to	superintend	business	
and	make	strategic	decisions.	Some	came	and	went	–	like	the	Committee	for	Accounts	–	which	
operated	only	in	the	very	early	days	of	the	Bank.	The	Committee	in	Waiting	was	constantly	
constituted	 to	 superintend	 the	 day-to-day	 running	 of	 the	 Bank.	 It	 was	 the	 Committee	 of	
Treasury,	 however,	 that	 was	 most	 prominent.	 It	 was	 made	 up	 of	 the	 governor,	 deputy	
governor	 and	 a	 selection	 of	 senior	 directors.	 It	 was	 regarded	 by	 one	 critic	 of	 the	 Bank,	
Alderman	William	Pickett,	as	a	‘dark	and	concealed	system	of	management’	which	sat	and	
made	decisions	‘without	the	deliberation	of	the	whole	Court’.34	The	Minutes	of	the	Courts	of	
Directors	might	reflect	this	account.	Clapham	found	that	some	‘important	business’	was	not	
presented	 to	 the	 Court	 of	 Directors	 and	 the	Minutes	 of	 Court	 offer	 little	 sense	 of	 active	
discussion	of	 the	business	 that	was	presented	 to	 them.35	Yet,	 this	was	 the	nature	of	 such	
documents	and	lack	of	detail	in	the	record	is	not	uncommon.	Equally,	there	is	no	indication	
that	the	majority	of	shareholders	were	dissatisfied	with	the	way	the	Bank	was	being	managed.	
Indeed,	William	Pickett’s	aim	in	writing	was	to	arouse	the	shareholders	to	some	action	after	
                                                            
32 Ibid., p. 90.  
33 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 199.  
34 William Pickett Esq., An apology to the Public for a continued Intrusion on their Notice with an Appeal to the 
free and independent Proprietors of Bank Stock, demonstrating that it is highly proper for them to examine into 
the State of their Affairs (London, 1788), p. 36.  
35 Clapham, Bank of England, p. 202.  
11 
 
a	 period	 in	 which	 very	 few	 participated	 in	 the	 Bank’s	 democratic	 processes.	 Clapham	
estimates	 that,	 during	 the	 early	 1780s,	 only	 around	 100	 to	 130	 of	 the	 more	 than	 2,000	
shareholders	 eligible	 to	 vote	 attended	 meetings.	 Thus,	 although	 the	 shareholders	
theoretically	had	the	right	to	influence	the	management	decisions	taken	by	the	Bank,	they	
did	not	exercise	it,	at	least	not	while	things	were	going	well	and	dividends	were	being	paid	
regularly.		
Below	the	directors	sat	the	clerks	who	made	the	business	happen.	That	there	was	a	
hierarchy	at	the	eighteenth-century	Bank	of	England	in	which	men	regarded	themselves	in	
positions	 above	 their	 colleagues	 is	 absolutely	 clear.	 The	 term	management	 is	 used,	 albeit	
sparingly,	in	the	Committee	of	Inspection’s	reports,	indicating	that	there	was	an	expectation	
that	 business	was	 being	 organised	 and	 ordered.	 Indeed,	 the	 report	 speaks	 of	 the	 overall	
‘management’	of	the	institution	and	refers	several	times	to	the	‘management’	of	government	
debt	undertaken	on	behalf	of	the	state.36	The	term	manager	was	not	used	at	all	but	the	report	
makes	 numerous	mentions	 of	 the	 term	 supervisor	 and	 speaks	 of	 the	 superintendence	 of	
business.	It	also	makes	numerous	mentions	of	the	terms	‘superior’	and	‘chief’,	with	regard	to	
chief	men,	and	as	a	common	description	for	the	head	of	an	office.37		
The	 Bank’s	 chief	 men	 found	 it	 straight-forward	 to	 articulate	 the	 structure	 and	
organisation	 of	 their	 departments.	 	 Thus	when	Abraham	Newland,	 the	 chief	 cashier,	was	
called	before	the	Committee	of	Inspection	‘he	laid	before	them	a	List	of	the	Several	Officers	
in	his	department’.	The	list	read:		
					No.	1.			The	InTellers	who	receive	&	pay	Money.		
                                                            
36 BEA, M5/212, fo. 1; fo.123; fo. 136; M5/213, fo. 173; fo. 179.  
37 BEA, M5/212 and M5/213, passim.  
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2. The	OutTellers	who	receive	Money	for	bills	of	exchange	&	notes	of	hand	at	
the	houses	of	the	persons	to	whom	they	are	address’d.		
3. The	Clerks	 in	 the	Drawing	Office	where	 the	Accounts	 are	 kept	 of	 those	
persons	who	keep	cash	at	the	Bank.		
4. The	Clerks	in	the	Bill	Office	where	the	Accounts	are	kept	of	the	bills	&	notes	
left	by	those	persons	who	keep	cash	at	the	Bank	to	be	receiv’d	when	due	
&	placed	to	their	accounts.	And	the	Clearers	who	receive	of	the	OutTellers	
the	money	collected	daily	by	them	for	payment	of	bills.		
5. The	Clerks	at	the	Cash	Books	where	the	Bank	Notes	&	Bank	Post	Bills	are	
made	out	&	entered	when	issued	&	when	paid.		
6. The	Clerks	in	the	Discount	Office		
7. The	Clerks	in	the	Bullion	Office.		
8. The	Clerks	who	receive	the	public	money	on	accot	of	Loans.		
9. The	Clerks	who	attend	the	Receipt	of	his	Majesty’s	Exchequer	on	the	Bank’s	
Accot.		
10. The	 Care	 of	 the	 Treasure	 not	 in	 the	 Vaults	 under	 the	 inspection	 of	 the	
Cashiers.		
11. The	Clerks	who	pay	the	Interest	to	the	Proprietors	of	Bank	Stock	&	of	such	
part	of	the	national	Debt	as	is	transacted	there.		
12. The	Clerks	who	check	the	same	or	the	Warrant	Office.		
13. The	Clerks	who	receive	&	pay	money	on	accot	of	the	Suitors	in	the	Court	of	
Chancery,	&	
14. The	Clerks	at	the	General	Cash	Book.38		
                                                            
38 BEA, M5/212, fos. 3-4.  
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The	 Chief	 Accountant,	 Payne,	 did	 likewise	 for	 the	 offices	 under	 his	 control.	 In	 a	modern	
business	these	structures	would	be	expressed	as	organisational	flowcharts.	This	‘descriptive,	
linguistic	system’	of	analysis,	however,	is	typical	throughout	the	Inspectors’	report	and	is	the	
way	inspections	were	conducted	over	the	next	century	or	so.39	Consistent	with	that	approach,	
the	 chief	 men’s	 overviews	 were	 further	 explored	 in	 specific	 interviews	 about	 the	 way	
particular	offices	worked	and	interacted	with	each	other.	Thus:		
	
Mr	Newland	was	called	in	&	ask’d	in	what	light	he	consider’d	the	Clearers:		
He	said,	the	two	Juniors	are	accountable	to	Mr	Pamphilion	the	senior	Clearer	&	are	
bound	to	follow	his	directions;	their	Office	is	separate	from	the	Bill	Office	&	they	are	
accountable	only	to	himself	as	Chief	Cashier.	Mr	Newland	inform’d	the	Committee	
that	the	OutTellers	are	not	immediately	under	the	Senior	OutTeller	so	as	to	be	oblig’d	
to	follow	his	directions;	but	are	accountable	to	Mr	Church	in	the	first	instance.	That	
the	InTellers	are	immediately	under	Mr	Campe,	the	senior,	&	he	is	expected	to	attend	
to	their	good	behaviour.40		
	
The	men,	 therefore,	 understood	 that	 there	was	 a	 rigid	 reporting	 structure	 outside	 of	 the	
directorship	and	use	of	words	like	‘accountable’	and	‘obliged’	confirm	that	the	senior	men	
were	 responsible	 for	 the	 organisation	 and	 efficiency	 of	 their	 part	 of	 the	 business,	 were	
empowered	 to	 issue	 instructions	 and	 expected	 to	 be	 heeded.	 Equally,	 the	 Committee	 of	
Inspection	overtly	acknowledged	the	hierarchies	that	existed	by	always	turning	first	to	the	
senior	men	in	each	office.	In	doing	so	they	validated	the	managerial	system	that	had	been	put	
in	place.		
Although	the	evidence	is	limited,	the	records	preserved	in	the	Bank’s	archives	can	give	
a	sense	of	the	training	and	career	development	routes	towards	a	senior	position	in	the	Bank.	
                                                            
39 A. McKinlay and R. G.Wilson, ‘“Small acts of cunning”: bureaucracy, inspection and the career, c. 1890-
1914’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 17 (2006), p. 658.  
40 M5/212, fo. 29.   
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The	Bank	operated	an	internal	labour	market.	Men	were	recruited	only	at	entry	level	and	on	
an	initial	£50	salary.	It	is	not	made	clear	how	long	it	was	before	men	were	considered	fully	
competent	but	it	has	been	possible	to	trace	the	amount	of	time	the	men	on	the	payroll	 in	
1783	waited	for	their	 first	salary	 increment.	This	shows	that,	on	average,	the	first	pay	rise	
came	after	3.5	years	of	service,	which	perhaps	indicates	a	minimum	period	of	service	before	
clerks	were	 considered	 fully	 competent	 in	 their	work.41	At	 the	East	 India	Company,	 clerks	
were	asked	to	work	for	three	years	before	receiving	a	salary,	which	offers	some	corroboration	
to	 the	 suggestion	 that	 this	 was	 a	 minimum	 requirement.42	 As	 the	 following	 charts	
demonstrate,	salary	certainly	rose	with	age	and	experience.		
	
Figure	1:	Salary	of	cohort	of	1783	by	length	of	experience			
	
Source:	BEA,	E41,	Staff	salary	ledgers,	passim.		
	
	
                                                            
41 Calculation based on a sample of 287 out of 321 cases.   
42 Bowen, Business of Empire, p. 141.   
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Figure	2:	Salary	of	cohort	of	1783	by	age		
	
Source:	BEA,	E41,	Staff	salary	ledgers,	passim.		
	
Salaries	 also	 reflected	 a	 high	 status	 for	 the	 chief	men	 and	managers.	 In	 1783	 the	
highest	paid	men	were	the	chief	accountant,	John	Payne	and	Abraham	Newland,	the	chief	
cashier,	 both	 of	 whom	 earned	 £250	 per	 annum.	 Payne’s	 deputies	 earned	 £170	 p.a.	 and	
Newland’s	deputies	were	paid	£200	a	year.	The	average	salary	in	the	Accountants’	office	was	
£87	per	annum	and	the	average	in	the	Cashiers’	office	was	£101	per	annum,	a	differential	
which	reflected	the	slightly	different	service	profiles	of	the	clerks	in	the	two	departments.	The	
Bank’s	total	clerical	wage	bill	for	1783	was	£31,	085.43	
Although	somewhat	anecdotal,	the	career	trajectory	of	Mr	Walsh	of	the	3	per	cent	
Consols	office,	 as	 reported	 to	 the	Committee	of	 Inspection,	 is	 instructive	about	how	men	
might	have	learned	their	trade	and	progressed	into	senior	positions.	He	told	the	Committee;		
That	he	had	been	12	years	in	the	Bank,	&	for	the	last	4	years	one	of	the	3	Chief	
Clerks	of	 this	Office,	being	appointed	Assistant	to	Mr	Miller	&	Mr	Vickery.	That	
                                                            
43 BEA, E41, passim.  
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when	he	first	came	into	the	Bank,	he	was	placed	in	the	department	of	the	Chief	
Cashier	where	he	went	through	the	Offices	of	OutTeller	&	InTeller,	&	was	some	
time	at	one	of	the	Cash	books	&	assisted	in	the	Bullion	Office	at	the	time	of	taking	
in	 the	 deficient	 Gold	 Coin;	 he	 was	 afterwards	 removed	 into	 the	 Accountants	
Office,	which	he	went	through;	&	from	thence	to	the	3	P	Ct	Consols,	where	he	has	
seen	every	part	of	the	business	before	he	was	appointed	one	of	the	Chief	Clerks.44	
	
Walsh’s	 description	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 experiences	of	 his	 counterparts	 at	 the	 East	 India	
Company	who	often	ended	their	careers	in	the	same	office	in	which	they	began	and	in	many	
cases	had	no	direct	experience	of	the	Indian	affairs	that	they	managed.45		
There	is	no	way	of	ascertaining	whether	Walsh’s	rise	to	seniority	was	typical	of	the	
Bank’s	clerks	but	we	can	argue	that	his	expertise	was	gained	on	the	 job	and	at	the	Bank’s	
expense,	 rather	 than	being	a	product	of	 external	 training	or	 indeed	education.	As	Pollard	
argues,	this	was	a	time	when	‘formal	management	training	was	so	rare	as	to	be	negligible’.46	
Equally,	general	education	provision	more	generally	was	poor	and	did	not	fit	men	well	 for	
clerical	work.47	Nonetheless,	clearly	technical	competence	could	be	learned	on	the	job	and	
Mr	Walsh’s	career	history	seems	to	demonstrate	precisely	that.		
Yet	 detailed	 knowledge	 of	 working	 practices	 and	 systems	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	
managerial	skill.	Pollard’s	analysis	revealed	that	many	eighteenth-century	entrepreneurs,	like	
James	Watt,	had	‘excessive	difficulty	in	finding	intelligent	managing	clerks’.48	This	would	seem	
to	suggest	that	finding	men	who	had	the	requisite	skills,	and	in	whom	trust	could	be	reposed,	
was	not	straight-forward.	With	regard	to	the	Bank,	the	Inspectors’	report	is	generally	silent	
on	individual	men’s	abilities.	Nonetheless,	a	separate	notebook	kept	by	one	of	the	Inspectors,	
                                                            
44 BEA, M5/213, fo. 78.  
45 Bowen, Business of Empire, p. 141; p. 143.  
46 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 147.  
47 David Mitch, ‘Education and skill of the British labour force’ in R. Floud and P. Johnson (eds.), The 
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain. Volume I: Industrialisation, 1700-1860 (Cambridge, 2004), 
pp. 346-47.  
48 Quoted in Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 160.  
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Samuel	Bosanquet,	can	give	some	revealing	insights.	Bosanquet	wrote	of	Mr	Walsh	as	‘very	
intelligent,	very	able,	and	the	only	one	fit	for	a	head	yet	seen’.	Mr	Walton	of	the	3	per	Cent	
Reduced	Office	was	pronounced	to	be	a	 ‘very	clever	hand,	very	sensible	and	capable’.	Mr	
Priaulx	was	judged	to	be	‘allway	[sic]	ready	to	act,	&	very	capable’.	However,	there	was	not	
universal	 praise	 for	 the	 senior	 men.	 Mr	 Bridges,	 principal	 of	 the	 dividend	 warrants	 was	
condemned	as	‘a	chattering	fellow,	not	fit	to	be	placed	in	any	more	conspicuous	light’.	Mr	
Wilde	was	noted	as	having	ability	but	apparently	he	‘drinks	&	then	[gets]	muddled	&	lost’.49	
Ability	and	fitness	to	lead,	therefore,	were	not	skills	automatically	to	be	found	even	in	men	
who	had	risen	to	the	more	senior	ranks.		
	
The	acculturation	of	labour	
Pollard	regarded	the	recruitment	and	‘rational	and	methodical	management	of	labour’	as	a	
central	 problem	 facing	 entrepreneurs	 during	 industrialisation.50	 He	 cited	 contemporary	
arguments	that	the	workforce	available	to	entrepreneurs	was	temperamentally	unsuited	to	
long	hours	spent	in	monotonous	work.	Workers	were	regarded	as	‘transient,	marginal	and	
deviant’.51	Thompson	too	wrote	of	contemporaries’	attempts	to	inculcate	a	new	form	of	time-
discipline	 into	 workers.52	 Both	 Thompson	 and	 Pollard	 argued	 that	 factory	 owners	 were	
battling	to	enforce	a	wrench	from	a	past	in	which	labour	in	the	domestic	workshop	allowed	
the	worker	more	 freedom	and	autonomy.	Yet,	 in	 spite	of	 the	 importance	attached	 to	 the	
acculturation	 of	 labour,	 Pollard	 investigations	 suggested	 that	 factory	 owners	 made	 no	
scientific	breakthrough	here.	Problems	were	met	and	resolved	through	improvisation.	Some,	
                                                            
49 BEA, M5/471, Memorandum book of Samuel Bosanquet, 1783-1791.  
50 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, pp. 189-90.  
51 Quoted in ibid., p. 190.  
52 E. P. Thompson, ‘Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism’, Past and Present, 38 (1967), pp. 56-97.  
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like	 Robert	 Owen	 were	 supportive	 of	 their	 workers.	 Others	 relied	 on	 more	 draconian	
methods,	with	corporal	punishment,	especially	of	child	workers,	fines	or	even	dismissal	being	
meted	out	as	a	means	of	maintaining	discipline.53			
The	Bank	was	undoubtedly	a	more	pleasant	working	environment	than	the	factory,	it	
attracted	workers	of	a	higher	social	status	and	offered	better	long-term	prospects,	including	
a	pension	for	those	who	were	unable	to	work	though	ill-health	or	who	sought	to	retire	in	later	
life.	More	recent	studies	of	working	time	also	demonstrate	that	many	were	already	working	
long	days	prior	to	the	rise	of	the	factory	system.	Voth’s	study	of	time	and	work	in	London	
suggests	an	average	working	day	that	started	between	6.00	and	7.00am	and	continued	until	
around	seven	in	the	evening.54	We	may	be	confident,	therefore,	that	the	Bank	of	England	was	
drawing	on	a	pool	of	workers,	at	least	some	of	whom	were	attuned	to	long	working	days	and	
were	incentivised	to	at	least	do	the	minimum	required	to	keep	their	positions.		
Yet,	there	were	also	unpleasant	aspects	to	labour	at	the	Bank.	Sitting	cramped	over	
ledgers	did	 indeed	take	a	toll	on	general	health	and	eyesight.55	There	 is	some	evidence	to	
suggest	that	conditions	could	be	unpleasant	in	some	offices.	It	was	reported	to	the	Inspectors	
that	‘the	Library	is	so	cold	&	damp	for	the	greatest	part	of	the	year,	that	the	Clerks	are	afraid	
of	 continuing	 there	 the	 necessary	 time	 for	 doing	 the	 business	 required’.56	 On	 another	
occasion	it	was	noted	that	the	Transfer	Offices	‘not	having	any	chimnies	or	other	apertures	
for	 the	admission	of	 fresh	Air,	are	 so	unwholesome	as	greatly	prejudice	 the	health	of	 the	
                                                            
53 Sidney Pollard, ‘Factory Discipline in the Industrial Revolution’, Economic History Review, 16 (1963), pp. 
254-271.  
54 Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Time and Work in Eighteenth-Century England’, Journal of Economic History, 58 
(1998), p. 33.  
55 Rosenhaft notes the impact on occupational health of clerical work. Eve Rosenhaft, ‘Hands and Minds: 
Clerical work in the first “information society”’, International Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, 48 (2003), p. 
39. 
56 BEA, M5/213, fo. 164.  
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Persons	employed	in	them’.57	Occupational	health	might	also	have	been	affected	by	stress.	
The	work	was	intensive	and	errors	could	have	serious	financial	consequences.		
Nonetheless,	finding	men	prepared	to	risk	the	unpleasant	features	of	work	at	the	Bank	
in	order	to	gain	the	potential	rewards	was	not	difficult.	The	directors	might	have	filled	each	
vacancy	several	times	over.	However,	finding	men	who	were	able	to	perform	the	work	was	
more	problematic	and	thus,	by	the	end	of	 the	eighteenth	century	the	Bank	had	advanced	
procedures	 for	 recruitment.	 Its	 policies	 ensured	 that	 all	 new	 employees	 had	 been	
recommended	by	one	of	the	directors	of	the	Bank.	While	this	personal	introduction	did	not	
guarantee	 fitness	 for	 a	 position,	 the	 Bank	 followed	 up	 by	 testing	 new	 entrants	 prior	 to	
acceptance.	Each	applicant	was	subjected	to	tests	of	their	ability	to	write	well,	to	add	columns	
of	figure	and	to	be	able	to	deal	with	money.58	Some	candidates	did	well	but,	where	systematic	
examination	is	possible,	there	is	revealed	a	clear	gap	between	the	skills	possessed	by	the	men	
applying	for	jobs	at	the	Bank	and	the	skills	required	by	the	institution.59		
The	Bank	addressed	the	skills	gap	by	through	training	and	development,	as	we	have	
seen,	but	principally	through	specialisation	of	functions.	Most	men	working	at	the	Bank	at	
junior	levels	spent	their	days	engaged	in	mundane	and	repetitive	work.	They	did	the	same	
task	 over	 and	 over	 again	 throughout	 the	 day	 and,	 we	 can	 assume,	 repetition	 brought	
competence.	Arguably	what	can	be	observed	here	is	actually	a	process	of	‘deskilling’	of	what	
we	typically	might	think	of	as	skilled	work.	Breaking	such	work	down	into	its	component	parts	
simplified	it	and	made	it	easier	to	train	individuals	to	do	it	well.	A	similar	process	apparently	
                                                            
57 Ibid., fo. 22.  
58 For a full account of the recruitment process see Anne L. Murphy, ‘Writes a fair hand and appears to be well 
qualified’: recruiting Bank of England clerks at the start of the nineteenth century’, Financial History Review, 
22 (2015), pp. 19-44.  
59 Ibid.  
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occurred	in	industrial	production	where,	it	 is	suggested,	dividing	processes	into	specialised	
steps	meant	considerably	less	investment	in	skill	acquisition.60		
Specialisation	was	not	a	solution	for	all	the	Bank’s	potential	labour-related	issues.	It	
was,	of	course,	particularly	vulnerable	to	errors	and	fraud.	One	way	of	combatting	those	risks	
was	to	create	a	culture	of	loyalty	among	clerks.	At	their	election,	or	initial	employment,	each	
clerk	was	required	to	swear	an	oath	of	fidelity	and	to	commit	to	keeping	the	Bank’s	business	
private.	Technically	clerks	were	re-elected	each	year	and,	therefore,	renewed	their	oaths	each	
year	as	well.61	The	Bank	did	not	just	rely	on	its	clerks’	sense	of	loyalty.	Each	clerk	was	also	
expected	 to	 provide	 the	 Bank	 with	 personal	 security	 backed	 by	 an	 independent	 bond	
guarantor.	These	bonds	started	at	£500	for	junior	clerks	and	rose	to	a	maximum	of	£5,000,	
depending	on	responsibility.	The	Bank	was	diligent	both	in	maintaining	up-to-date	records	for	
guarantors	and	pursuing	compensation	in	the	event	of	significant	losses	resulting	from	errors	
or	dishonesty.62	For	less	serious	offences	or	occasions	when	the	Bank	incurred	financial	losses	
through	 negligence,	 clerks	 could	 find	 their	 wages	 stopped	 in	 order	 to	 compensate	 the	
institution.		
With	 regard	 to	 day-to-day	 work	 discipline,	 a	 particular	 problem	 in	 the	 factory	 was	
ensuring	 the	 regularity	of	work	and	attendance.	Pollard	 cites	high	 turnover	of	 labour	and	
frequent	tardiness	and	absence.63	Like	all	large-scale	workshops	and	early	factories,	the	Bank	
kept	an	appearance	book	to	record	the	clerks’	arrival	times.	Matthias	Alcock,	the	principal	
door-keeper	and	the	man	charged	with	keeping	that	book,	told	the	Inspectors	that	he	drew	
‘a	line	every	day	about	10	minutes	after	9,	to	mark	the	names	of	those	who	do	not	come	to	
                                                            
60 Mitch, ‘Education and skill’, p. 347. 
61 Acres, Bank from Within, p. 132.  
62 Ibid., p. 133.  
63 Pollard, Genesis of Modern Management, p. 213.  
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their	 time’.64	 Tardiness	was	 not	 ignored	 and	 the	 Inspectors	 reinforced	 the	 expectation	 of	
punctuality.	In	their	interviews	with	each	senior	man,	they	asked	for	an	account	of	their	staff	
which	included	details	of	their	time-keeping.	Thus	Mr	Clifford,	head	of	the	Drawing	Office,	
informed	the	Committee	that	his	men	were	‘very	regular	&	well	qualified	for	their	business,	
which	 was	 very	 necessary,	 for	 matters	 of	 immense	 consequence	 passed	 through	 their	
hands’.65	 Indeed,	all	heads	except	for	Mr	Vickery	praised	the	men	under	their	supervision.	
Vickery,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 when	 interviewed	 by	 the	 Committee	 said,	 ‘that	 a	 custom	
prevailed	among	the	Clerks	of	going	out	frequently	during	the	day	without	making	application	
to	him	for	leave:	&	that	some	do	give	in	their	names	as	having	had	leave	till	10	in	the	morning,	
without	his	knowledge’.66	Vickery	was	known	to	have	poor	working	 relationships	with	 the	
men	under	him	yet	his	account	of	petty	absenteeism	was	probably	more	accurate	than	his	
colleagues’	 accounts	 of	 absolute	 compliance.	 Although	 the	 1783	 Committee	 did	 not	 find	
much	to	complain	of,	later	Committees	did	find	regular	tardiness	and	absence	among	some	
men.67	There	is,	however,	no	indication	that	the	Bank	could	not	function	or	was	materially	
affected	because	of	nonattendance.			
Although	the	Bank	of	England	had	‘sticks’	with	which	to	enforce	compliance	to	its	rules,	
there	is	little	evidence	that	they	were	used	except	in	the	most	serious	of	cases.	Only	thirteen	
dismissals	can	be	traced	among	those	employed	in	1783,	just	over	4%	of	the	total	number	of	
employees.68	Moreover,	while	Pollard	emphasised	the	imposition	of	strict	discipline	in	factory	
work,	 more	 recently	 scholars	 have	 focused	 on	 communication	 and	 negotiation	 between	
                                                            
64 BEA, M5/213, fo. 165.  
65 BEA, M5/212, fo. 85.  
66 BEA, M5/213, fo. 64.  
67 Acres, Bank from Within, pp. 356-57.  
68 BEA, E41, passim.  
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employees	 and	 employers.69	 There	 is	 evidence	 of	 this	 in	 the	 Committee	 of	 Inspection’s	
reports	as	well.	In	particular,	when	clerks	in	the	Accountants’	Office,	who	were	employed	in	
posting	bills	of	exchange,	used	the	occasion	of	the	Inspection	to	petition	for	an	increase	in	
pay.	Their	case	was	taken	up	by	the	Inspectors	who	agreed	that	they	were	indeed	paid	‘very	
inadequately	to	the	additional	trouble	&	labour	bestowed	by	them	in	doing	this	Business’	and	
‘recommended	 to	 the	 Governor	 &	 Committee	 of	 Treasury	 to	 take	 their	 case	 into	
consideration’.70	 The	 acculturation	 of	 labour,	 therefore,	 was	 a	 complex	 process	 in	 which	
punishment	or	 threat	of	punishment	 coexisted	with	 the	 support	of,	 and	negotiation	with,	
workers.	
	
Use	of	gathered	information	in	rational	decision-making	
In	 his	 discussion	 of	 rational	 decision-making,	 Pollard	 focused	 on	 accounting.	 Accounting,	
based	primarily	on	double-entry	book-keeping,	was	well-established	 in	eighteenth-century	
Britain	and	used	by	individuals	at	all	social	strata.	The	plebeian	farming	family,	the	Lathams,	
for	example,	kept	an	account	book	throughout	the	mid-eighteenth	century.71	For	the	Bank	of	
England	accounting	was	a	key	technology.72	The	institution	had	been	using	highly	complex	
bookkeeping	systems	since	its	inception	in	1694.	Including	the	General	Ledger	and	Stock	and	
Annuity	Ledgers,	the	Bank	maintained	a	wide	variety	of	cash	books,	account	ledgers,	ledgers	
relating	to	the	issuance	of	bank	notes,	lists	of	lost	notes,	details	of	discounted	bills,	bullion	
                                                            
69 Kate Smith, Material Goods, Moving Hands: perceiving production in England, 1700-1830 (Manchester, 
2014), pp. 86-87.  
70 BEA, M5/213, fo. 48.  
71 Alice Dolan, ‘The Fabric of Life: Time and Textiles in an Eighteenth-Century Plebeian Home’, Home 
Cultures: The Journal of Architecture, Design and Domestic Space, 11 (2014), pp. 353-374.  
72 For a discussion of bookkeeping as a key technology, especially in European state-formation, see Pepijn 
Brandon, ‘Accounting for Power: Bookkeeping and the Rationalization of Dutch Naval Administration’ in Jeff 
Fynn-Paul ed. War, Entrepreneurs and the State in Europe and the Mediterranean 1300-1800 (Leiden, 2014), p. 
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ledgers	 and	 a	 variety	 of	 different	 registers	 covering	 all	 aspects	 of	 its	 business.73	 There	 is	
evidence	 that	 the	 books,	 and	 abstracts	 taken	 from	 them,	 were	 checked	 by	 the	 various	
Committees	and	the	Court	of	Directors	and	used	in	decision-making.	Thus	with	regard	to	bills	
it	was	noted	that	they	‘must	pass	the	Committee	in	waiting,	with	the	assistance	of	any	other	
Directors	that	chuse	to	attend,	&	are	not	carried	to	the	credit	of	the	discounter	until	they	have	
pass’d	the	Court	on	the	following	day’.	Abstracts	then	prepared	were	‘laid	before	the	Court	
on	 Thursday,	 together	with	 another	made	out	 alphabetically	 expressing	 the	 sums	 that	 go	
off’.74	Likewise	systems	of	accounts	were	used	as	checks	and	balances.	Thus	the	accounts	of	
the	Court	of	Chancery,	which	were	managed	by	the	Bank,	required	‘a	general	balance	being	
taken	every	year	in	the	month	of	October,	when	the	Account	is	pricked	over,	&	agreed	with	
the	Chancery	Account:	after	which	it	is	signed	by	the	Head	of	this	Office,	&	then	certified	by	
the	Chief	Accountant	of	the	Bank,	when	it	is	sent	to	the	Accountant	General	of	the	Court	of	
Chancery,	who	delivers	it	to	the	Lord	Chancellor’.75		
The	 very	 existence	 of	 these	 systems	 say	 something	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 precocity	 as	 an	
eighteenth-century	 business.	 The	 level	 and	 complexity	 of	 its	work	 could	 not	 be	managed	
without	robust	accounting	systems.	This	is	especially	clear	in	the	management	of	the	national	
debt	and	 it	sets	the	Bank	apart	certainly	 from	some	departments	of	 the	state	which	were	
sometimes	chaotic.76	Yet,	Pollard’s	underlying	question	was	whether	information	gathering	
and	 analysis	 was	 used	 in	 the	 control	 and	 development	 of	 the	 business.	 Arguably	 the	
establishment	of	a	system	of	Inspection	at	the	Bank	provides	insight	into	this	issue	that	moves	
                                                            
73 For a short digest of the surviving ledgers see Clapham, Bank of England, I, p. 303.  
74 BEA M5/212, fo. 53.  
75 BEA, M5/213, fo. 115.  
76 Brandon, ‘Accounting for Power’, p. 152.  
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beyond	 accounting	 systems.	 Indeed,	 the	 Committee’s	 reports	 give	 us	 several	 excellent	
examples	of	the	use	of	information	in	rational	decision-making.		
The	Inspectors	were	not	just	engaged	in	an	inspection	of	process,	they	were	interested	
in	formulating	improvements.	In	one	case,	they	dedicated	much	time	to	finding	‘safe’	systems	
for	the	storage	of	notes	and	bills.	Indeed,	they	explained	in	their	first	report	that	‘To	form	a	
plan	that	may	put	so	very	large	a	property	in	a	State	of	Security;	without	at	the	same	time	
impeding	the	established	course	of	business;	has	engaged	much	of	our	attention’.77	The	issue	
was	simple.	Notes	and	bills	had	to	be	to	hand	throughout	the	day	and	thus	they	were	removed	
from	the	safes	each	morning	and	then	lay		
exposed	 through	 the	whole	 course	 of	 the	 day,	 not	 only	 to	 every	 Clerk	 in	 that	
Office…but	also	to	many	others	who	transact	business	near	the	place;	&	even	to	
Persons	 unconnected	with	 the	 Bank,	 whose	 occasions	 frequently	 require	 their	
being	admitted	into	the	Bill	Office.78		
	
Ultimately	a	solution	was	found	to	the	problem	but	it	is	the	process	of	identifying	the	problem	
that	is	of	most	interest.	It	came	to	light	through	the	Inspection	and	was	highlighted,	as	the	
Inspectors’	report	demonstrates	by	the	evidence	of	‘Mr	Church,	Mr	Mayor	and	Mr	Bourne,	
the	3	Chief,	&	of	Mr	Holland,	one	of	the	subordinate	Clerks	in	the	Bill	Office’.79	
In	 addition	 to	 their	 attempts	 to	 improve	 security,	 the	 Inspectors	 committed	 time	 to	
exploring	 the	most	 efficient	 means	 of	 doing	 the	 work.	 In	 this	 they	 worked	 on	 the	 same	
principles	 of	 gathering	 information	 but	 they	 also	 consulted	 the	 clerks	 about	 possible	
solutions.	Thus,	a	plan	to	revise	systems	of	issuing	banknotes	was	discussed	with	Mr	Newland,	
the	chief	cashier,	and	put	before	several	of	the	senior	men	before	being	implemented.	Mr	
Gething	commented	that	 ‘he	did	not	at	present	see	any	objection	to	 its	being	adopted,	&	
                                                            
77 BEA. M5/213, fo. 72.  
78 BEA, M5/212, fos. 70-71.  
79 Ibid., fo. 70.  
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thought	under	proper	alterations	it	was	very	feasible’.80	Mr	Gardner,	on	the	other	hand,	was	
recorded	to	have	offered	objections	to	the	plans	but	according	to	the	Inspectors’	account	‘did	
not	 state	 any	one	which	 seemed	well	 founded:	 his	 objections	 arising	principally	 from	 the	
apprehension	of	having	so	considerable	a	Charge	committed	to	his	care’.81		
The	most	significant	set	of	changes	implemented	by	the	Inspectors,	however,	was	in	the	
Transfer	Offices	where,	it	was	argued,	customers	were	being	inconvenienced	by	being	kept	
waiting	for	long	periods	of	time.	This	apparently	had	been	the	cause	of	many	complaints.82	
Reorganising	the	timings	of	the	various	tasks	in	the	Transfer	Offices	was	the	proposed	solution	
to	this	problem	and	here	the	solutions	came	from	the	clerks	themselves.	Thus,	Mr	Reeves,	
when	called	before	the	Inspectors	suggested	that	the		
time	for	putting	in	Transfers	might	be	restrained	to	½	past	12	o’clock…	no	objections	
would	be	raised	to	it	by	the	Principal	Brokers:	for	it	would	facilitate	their	attendance	at	the	
East	India	house	&	South	Sea	house,	where	the	time	of	Transfer	is	from	12	‘till	1	o’clock,	which	
at	present	interferes	very	much	with	their	business	at	this	house.83		
	
This	demonstrates	both	Reeves’	 familiarity	with	the	 internal	workings	of	the	Bank	and	the	
wider	rhythms	of	the	City	but	also	the	Inspectors’	willingness	to	rely	on	the	expertise	they	
found	among	the	Bank’s	clerks.		
The	 flows	 of	 information	 and	 expertise	 between	 sites	 and	 individuals	 is	 being	
emphasised	in	more	recent	scholarship.84	In	this	respect,	perhaps	the	Bank’s	directors	were	
doing	 little	 different	 to	 other	 employers	 in	 listening	 to	 their	 workers	 and	 acting	 on	 their	
analyses	 of	 problems.	 Nonetheless,	 Pollard’s	 assessment	 of	 the	 use	 of	 accountancy	 and	
gathered	information	in	business	was	‘largely	negative’.	His	view	was	that	business	owners	
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84 See for example Margaret C. Jacob, Scientific Culture and the Making of the Industrial West (Oxford, 1997), 
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encountered	 technical	 difficulties	 in	 compiling	data	 and	 the	monopolistic	 advantages	 that	
many	entrepreneurs	enjoyed	during	the	late	eighteenth	century	meant	that	few	had	to	take	
precise	 account	 of	 their	 costs	 or	 to	 consider	 ways	 of	 cutting	 those	 costs	 or	 improving	
efficiency.85	 The	 Bank,	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 and	 although	 also	 enjoying	 a	 significant	
monopolistic	 advantage,	 was	 nonetheless	 concerned	 with	 improving	 the	 efficiency	 of	 its	
business	and	in	order	to	do	that,	it	was,	from	the	point	of	the	first	Inspections	in	1783	and	
after,	gathering,	and	acting	upon,	evidence.		
	
A	Theory	of	Management	
The	discussion	so	far	has	established	that,	at	the	eighteenth-century	Bank	of	England,	there	
existed	a	class	of	supervisors	and	managers,	that	there	were	attempts	to	acculturate	labour	
and	that	information	was	collected,	analysed,	consulted	upon	and	acted	upon	in	attempts	to	
improve	the	institution’s	efficiency	and	security.	To	argue	that	there	is	evidence	of	a	theory	
of	management,	however,	requires	us	to	establish	that	the	Bank’s	directors	and	senior	men	
were	 doing	more	 than	what	Wilson	 and	 Thomson	 describe	 as	 ‘the	 traditional	 or	 rule-of-
thumb’	approach	to	management,	defined	as	considering	issues	as	they	arose	and	devising	
solutions	based	on	past	experience.86	A	more	 systematic	approach	 to	management,	again	
using	Wilson	and	Thomson’s	useful	definitions,	requires	direction	and	control	from	above,	the	
definition	of	management	 jobs,	dealing	with	problems	in	a	systematic	fashion	and	seeking	
solutions	 in	 the	 ‘experience	 and	 thinking	 of	 others’	 and	 in	 encouraging	 an	 exchange	 of	
information.87		
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While	the	foregoing	discussion	has	demonstrated	that	there	was	direction	of	the	day-
to-day	 business	 of	 the	 Bank	 and	 that	 solutions	 to	 problems	 that	 arose	 were	 sought	 in	
knowledge	exchange,	it	might	be	argued	that	the	overall	development	of	business	was	not	
strategic.	Expansion	and	contraction	usually	occurred	in	response	to	the	demands	of	a	state	
at	war.	The	Bank’s	business,	its	staff	and	the	space	it	occupied	all	expanded	at	times	when	
the	 burdens	 of	 state	 debt	 increased.	 Since	 that	 was	 usually	 at	 the	 onset	 of	 war,	 it	 was	
impossible	to	plan	for	such	eventualities.	Yet,	if	the	Bank	did	not	undergo	planned,	strategic	
expansion	into	a	larger	scale	of	business	and	more	intimate	connections	to	the	state,	there	is	
still	evidence	that	the	Inspectors,	at	least,	had	a	very	strong	sense	of	a	wider	purpose	to	their	
business.	In	their	final	report	they	asserted	‘a	religious	Veneration	for	the	glorious	fabrick	[of	
the	Bank,	and]	a	steady	and	unremitting	attention	to	its	sacred	Preservation’.88	It	was	their	
view	that	given	
the	immense	importance	of	the	Bank	of	England	not	only	to	the	City	of	London,	in	
points	highly	essential	to	the	promotion	&	extension	of	its	Commerce,	but	to	the	
Nation	 at	 large,	 as	 the	 grand	 Palladium	 of	 Public	 Credit,	 we	 cannot	 but	 be	
thoroughly	persuaded	that	an	Object	so	great	in	itself	&	so	interesting	to	all	Ranks	
of	the	Community,	must	necessarily	excite	care	&	solicitude	in	every	breast,	for	
the	wise	administration	of	its	Affairs,	but	principally	and	directly	in	theirs	who	are	
entrusted	with	the	immediate	management	of	them.89	
	
		 The	act	of	reflection	that	was	the	year-long	inspection	also	led	to	the	identification	of	
more	fundamental	issues	relating	to	the	management	of	the	Bank	which	indicated	a	desire	to	
give	more	definition	to	managerial	 jobs	and	to	be	more	systematic	 in	the	management	of	
staff.	The	Inspectors’	recommendations	included,	‘a	better	defined	system	of	subordination’	
among	 the	 clerks	 with	 the	 intention	 of	 creating	 ‘a	 chain	 of	 obedience,	 from	 the	 Juniors	
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89 Ibid., fos. 178-79.  
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towards	the	Heads	of	their	respective	Offices’.90	Essentially	the	Inspectors	were	demanding	
that	the	Bank’s	managers	should	become	more	managerial	and	the	more	junior	men	should	
pay	more	attention	to	the	directions	of	their	superiors.	This	issue	principally	arose	because	
the	Inspection	uncovered	the	practice	of	the	most	senior	men	leaving	the	Bank	every	day	at	
around	 3.00pm	 and	 thus	 leaving	 some	 of	 the	 most	 important	 aspects	 of	 the	 business,	
including	securing	the	records	and	the	buildings	overnight,	in	the	hands	of	the	more	junior	
men.	 The	 Inspectors	 defined	 this	 as	 ‘extraordinary’.91	 And	 they	 asserted,	 ‘Time	may	 have	
sanctified	 the	 custom,	 [but]	 the	 reverse	 of	 it	would	 have	 appeared	 a	much	more	 natural	
regulation:	for	surely	if	in	any	situation	of	Trust	a	compleat	superintendence	is	desireable,	it	
must	be	more	immediately	necessary	where	the	Trust	is	of	such	infinite	importance’.92		
	 In	 addition	 to	 requiring	 greater	 managerial	 diligence	 from	 the	 senior	 men,	 the	
Inspectors	 reflected	upon	how	such	men	 rose	 to	prominence	and	 recommended	 that	 the	
directors	on	appointing	committees	‘pay	great	attention	to	the	abilities	&	characters	of	those	
they	nominate;	&	at	the	time	of	Election,	to	their	performances:	for	though	amongst	so	great	
a	number	it	cannot	be	expected	that	all	shall	be	equally	capable,	yet	care	should	be	taken	not	
to	 elect	 such	 as	 are	 apparently	 liable	 to	 exception’.93	 Promotions	 also	 required	 greater	
consideration	according	to	the	Inspectors.	While	the	system	that	pertained	at	the	time	of	the	
Inspection	ensured	that	promotion	was	chiefly	governed	by	seniority	and	that	was	regarded	
as	‘fair	&	equitable’,	the	Inspectors	noted	that	it	‘will	not	apply	in	all	cases,	nor	ought	it	to	be	
resorted	to	where	particular	Talents	are	required’.94		
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	 Thus	it	is	clear	that	although	the	Inspectors	may	not	have	been	formulating	a	theory	
of	management	in	their	final	report,	much	thought	had	been	given	to	the	factors	that	would	
contribute	to	the	effective	running	of	the	institution.	The	conclusions	reached	encompassed	
an	acknowledgement	that	the	people	in	managerial	roles	mattered.	Those	men	who	rose	to	
high	office	had	to	be	selected	on	merit	not	just	seniority,	they	had	to	have	authority	and	they	
had	to	be	prepared	to	demonstrate	authority.		
	
Conclusion	
The	 system	 of	 inspection	 at	 the	 Bank	 of	 England	 once	 implemented	 was	 not	 halted.	
Permanent	committees	were	established	for	monitoring	the	most	important	of	its	functions.	
From	 the	 start	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 a	 closer	 eye	was	 kept	 on	 the	 recruitment	 and	
management	 of	 staff	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 what	 was	 by	 this	 time	 a	 set	 of	 written	
regulations	 governing	 each	 office.	 The	 result	 of	 this	was	 tighter	 internal	 controls	 and	 the	
maintenance	of	 the	efficiency	 for	which	 the	Bank	was	already	 justly	 feted.	 If	we	 seek	 the	
genesis	of	modern	management,	therefore,	the	Bank	surely	offers	a	place	to	start.		
Yet,	 one	 issue	 does	 remain	 and	 that	 is	 the	 question	 of	 broader	 impact.	 Good	
managerial	practice	may	have	begun	to	develop	at	the	Bank	but	there	is	no	evidence	at	all	
that	 those	practices	were	disseminated	or	adopted	outside	 the	 institution.	 It	 is,	 however,	
possible	to	argue	that	the	institution’s	efficiency	and	effectiveness	were	observed	and	noted	
by	the	investing	public	hence	making	a	contribution	to	the	development	of	trust	in	the	British	
public	finances.	This	point	has	been	acknowledged	in	the	work	of	scholars	like	Brewer	and	
Daunton,	who	have	focused	on	the	ways	in	which	efficient	systems	of	taxation	underpinned	
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the	workings	 of	 the	 national	 debt.95	 It	 is	 time	 that	 scholars	 turned	 their	 attention	 in	 this	
respect	 to	 the	 British	 state’s	 systems	 of	 borrowing.	 Taxation	 was	 essential	 certainly	 but	
borrowing	provided	the	immediate	funds	needed	in	emergent	situations	like	war.	Taxation	
could	be	enforced,	lending	was	voluntary.	To	understand	the	success	of	the	British	state,	it	is	
necessary	to	understand	much	more	fully	how	it	borrowed.	Giving	attention	to	the	processes	
by	which	it	managed	that	borrowing	is	an	important,	and	hitherto	neglected,	part	of	the	story.	
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